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   Kaleidoscope
O
nce the rockets are up, who cares
where they come down? That’s not
my department – says Wernher von
Braun.” Tom Lehrer’s satirical song is an
important reminder of the social, ethical, and
legal responsibilities incumbent upon those
engaged in science and technology whether
in government, industry, or academia.
Fostering a culture of responsible innovation
that promotes and supports consideration of
the broader impacts of research and
development can contribute to the process
of ensuring that scientific and technological
advances are used only for peaceful purposes
and the benefit of humankind and the
environment.
The revised Recommendation on Science
and Scientific Researchers adopted by
UNESCO in 2017 underlines the civic and
ethical aspect of scientific research and
encourages the development of appropriate
mechanisms and measures that support and
promote the fullest exercise, respect, and
protection of the social responsibilities of
researchers. It is important that science
practitioners are able to “express
themselves freely and openly on the ethical,
human, scientific, social, or ecological value
of certain projects, and in those instances
where the development of science and
technology undermine human welfare,
dignity and human rights or is “dual-use”,
they [should] have the right to withdraw
from those projects if their conscience so
dictates and the right and responsibility to
express themselves freely on and to report
these concerns.”1
As regards the life sciences, the World Health
Organisation (WHO) defines dual-use
research of concern (DURC) as life sciences
research that has the potential to provide
knowledge, information, products or
technologies that could be directly
misapplied to create a significant threat with
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potential consequences to public health and
safety, agricultural species and other plants,
animals, and the environment.2
Consideration of DURC issues in life science
practice is an element of effective laboratory
biosecurity and relevant organisations and
research facilities should establish and have
in place appropriate arrangements for
ensuring a regular and continued risk
assessment of life science DURC throughout
the entire research cycle. In developing a
DURC risk assessment process, attention
should be given to emerging biological risks
arising from novel advances in life sciences
and related fields. Biotechnology is
progressing at a rapid pace and cutting-edge
capabilities including genomic editing and
gain-of-function experiments raise security
concerns regarding the integrity of the
existing international norms against the
development and use of biological and toxin
weapons by state or non-state actors.
Managing life science DURC research is a
complex multi-layered process that requires
the active engagement of multiple
stakeholders along the entire innovation
cycle. The World Organisation for Animal
Health (OIE) has developed an indicative
framework, which maps the range of
stakeholders with a role in the identification,
assessment, and management of dual-use
risks, including researchers and their
institutions, funding bodies, industry,
educators, scientific publishers and other
communicators of research, and regulatory
authorities.3 This framework allows
identifying needs and options for
strengthening the management of life science
DURC and enables different stakeholders to
develop a better understanding of their
specific responsibilities in safeguarding
research and innovation against accidental
or deliberate misuse.
Recently, the World Health Organisation has
initiated a series of consultations to foster a
dialogue on the development of standardised
approaches and tools for addressing life
science DURC research. This includes
outreach to science academies and councils,
science editors and publishers, and funders
and donors of life science research.4 The
consultations are part of a broader effort to
develop a Global Guidance Framework to
Harness the Responsible Use of the Life
Sciences.5 The envisaged Framework seeks
to assist scientific communities in
understanding the new ways in which their
research could create both benefits and risks.
To this end, it is recommended that the
development of the Framework is
accompanied by a process of providing
stakeholders with appropriate training,
resources, and tools for identifying,
assessing, and communicating DURC issues
in life sciences.6 The importance of engaging
life science stakeholders with DURC issues,
including through awareness-raising has also
been acknowledged as part of a WHO-led
horizon scanning exercise on the impact of
emerging technologies on global public
health.7
DURC issues in the life sciences often involve
the possibility of deliberate misuse by third
parties which is why such issues may not be
immediately evident to science
practitioners.8 Encouraging consideration of
DURC risks could benefit from the use of
innovative awareness-raising and training
approaches that could illustrate how such
risks may manifest themselves and what
steps and measures could be taken to
prevent and addresses potential
consequences. Active learning strategies
could be particularly useful, as they provide
for a richer and immersive training
experience that leverages peer-to-peer
interaction and self-assessment.9
To help promote consideration of DURC
issues among life science stakeholders, the
London Metropolitan University in the UK
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has recently published an awareness-raising
cartoon series available in multiple
languages.10 The series titled “Strengthening
the Web of Prevention against Chemical and
Biological Weapons” features five two-page
cartoons, whereby each cartoon examines a
specific concept related to biological (and
chemical) security (Figure 1). Concepts
covered in the series include (1) prevention
of biological weapons; (2) codes of conduct;
(3) education and awareness-raising; (4)
biological security culture; and (5) one health
security. The cartoons are designed as
illustrative scenarios that can be used for
Figure 1: Cartoon Series – “Strengthening the Web of Prevention against
Chemical and Biological Weapons”
facilitating deliberation and reflection on
DURC issues. The cartoon series has been
translated into 12 different languages,
including the six official UN languages:
Arabic, Armenian, Chinese, French,
German, Greek, Italian, Japanese, Russian,
Spanish, Ukrainian, and Urdu. The
translations have been carried out by
biological security experts and education
practitioners from around the world. The
cartoons series is open-source and available
in different languages via the London
Metropolitan University Repository.11
The cartoon series was discussed within the
framework of a webinar series on
“Responsible Science” hosted by the Science
and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU)
in June 2021.12 Dr Tatyana Novossiolova, a
Source: The cartoon series is available via the London Metropolitan University repository. For further
information, see London Metropolitan University, Heightened Risk of Disease as a Means of Terrorism,
say international security experts, Press release, 30 June 2021, https://www.londonmet.ac.uk/news/
spotlight/heightened-risk-of-disease-as-a-means-of-terrorism-say-international-security-experts/.
co-author of the series made a demo
presentation highlighting possible strategies
for using the cartoon scenarios for training
and awareness-raising. The cartoon series
has been piloted during a regular elective
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seminar on chemical and biological
disarmament taught as part of the
International Relations degree programme
at the National University of Lanus,
Argentina. The feedback received from
students attending the seminar has indicated
that the cartoons offer an easy-to-
understand approach for teaching complex
security concepts.13 Information about the
cartoon series was also shared at
international conferences in Russia and
China, as well as at the 39th Annual Meeting
of the European Culture Collections’
Organisation (ECCO).
Engaging life science stakeholders with DURC
issues is a long-term endeavour that requires
sustained and concerted action, as well as
international cooperation and adequate
resourcing. Earlier this year, the Inter-
Academy Partnership, an umbrella
organisation for more than 140 national,
regional, and global science academies,
endorsed the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines
for Codes of Conduct for Scientists which aim
to promote a culture of responsibility and
guard against the hostile misuse of life
sciences.14 The Tianjin Guidelines set out ten
elements for strengthening biosecurity
procedures and practices to reinforce the
norms enshrined in the 1975 Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and
ensure that life sciences are used only for
peaceful purposes. One of the elements of
the Tianjin Guidelines specifically refers to
the role of education and training in
preserving the integrity of laws, regulations,
international obligations, and norms with
relevance to the prohibition of biological and
toxin weapons.15
A Working Paper tabled at the latest BTWC
Meeting of Experts recommended that the
Ninth Review Conference of the Convention
should endorse the Tianjin Biosecurity
Guidelines and set up a mechanism for the
exchange of good practices on their
implementation during the next
Intersessional Process.16 Reaching
agreement on this proposal among States
Parties would constitute a significant move
to enhance the process for review and
assessment of relevant life science advances,
not least because it could help facilitate
scientist engagement with the Convention
and encourage the development and
implementation of biosecurity education and
awareness-raising programmes. Moreover,
any BTWC mechanisms that are pertinent
to the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines would
provide a forum for dialogue and exchange
with other relevant international initiatives,
including the World Health Organisation’s
Science and Technology Foresight for Global
Health initiative.17
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